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Abstract. This study aims to gain a better understanding of how effective government 
subsidization is in helping foster firms’ innovation. Drawing on the exploration/exploita-
tion perspective and based on data collected from Statistical Yearbook on Science and 
Technology Activities of Industrial Enterprises, we look into the relationship between gov-
ernment subsidization and Chinese firms’ innovation efficiency by applying a stochastic 
frontier analysis. The results show that when government subsidies are provided in small 
scale, firms’ innovation efficiency decreases; only when government subsidies increase to 
a certain scale, does firms’ innovation efficiency start to increase. We suggest that govern-
ment subsidization would generate better innovation performance should it concentrate on 
a smaller number of firms at one time. As existing research is still inconclusive regarding 
the relationship between government subsidization and firms’ technological innovation 
output, we shed light on the issue by revealing a “U-shaped” relationship between the two. 
Keywords: government subsidization, innovation efficiency, technological innovation, 
stochastic frontier analysis, complementary effect, crowding-out effect.
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Introduction
Technological innovation (hereafter, innovation) is the core driver for economic devel-
opment. Government subsidization is a policy commonly used to enhance firms’ inno-
vation activities. There is a belief that government subsidization has a positive impact 
on firms’ innovation output; however, research on this issue has not led to a consistent 
conclusion about the relationship between government subsidization and firms’ inno-
vation output. One stream of research maintains that government subsidization have a 
positive impact on firms’ innovation capabilities (e.g., Clausen 2009; Czarnitzki, Licht 
2006; Kleer 2010; Lee 2011; Wang 2011), while a second stream claims that govern-
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ment subsidization has no or a negative impact on firms’ innovation output (e.g., Can-
none, Ughetto 2014; Feng et al. 2011; Gorg, Strobl 2007; Hu 2001; Xiao et al. 2013). 
As such, there is a need to solve this puzzle.
We argue that these diverse findings are caused by a measurement problem. The rela-
tionship between innovation output and input is measured with the absolute amount of 
the two values by the existent research. Innovation output usually refers to the creation 
of new products and new processes (Coombs et al. 1996), though sometimes are meas-
ured by the number of patents (Brouwer, Kleinknecht 1999). Innovation input includes 
mostly R&D investment and sometimes the acquisition of external technologies (Tang 
2006). In this study, we simplify the innovation output as the creation of new products 
since new processes can be generally termed as new products, and innovation input as 
R&D investment because the purchase of external technologies can be considered as the 
expenditure on R&D. Innovation output can result from multiple sources of financial 
input, which can come from the government subsidies, from the firm’s own investment, 
from a bank’s loan, or from a venture capital. It may happen that the government sub-
sidy stays at the same level while other sources of input decrease, which may result in 
a decrease in innovation output. In this case, a negative relationship can occur between 
government subsidization and firms’ innovation output, which might not reflect the real-
ity – that it is the decrease of other sources of input that has caused the output decrease. 
Hence, by only looking at government subsidies, it is possible to miss the whole picture 
of the causes of innovation output. 
As a remedy, we will look at the issue from an angle that emphasizes innovation ef-
ficiency. Innovation efficiency refers to the ratio of innovation output over total input, 
that is to say, all sources of input, including government subsidies. Innovation efficiency 
is more comprehensive in reflecting innovation reality. Innovation efficiency increases 
can result from a smaller decrease of innovation output but a larger decrease of total 
input, or from a larger increase of output paired with a smaller increase of total input. 
With many countries facing financial crisis and subsequently economic downturn, it is 
very common that governments reduce their subsidies. Yet, firms are still anticipated to 
increase their innovation output given limited financial aid. Innovation output increases 
can happen even when government subsidies decrease, which occurs when there is 
successful management innovation (Birkinshaw et al. 2008). When the absolute inno-
vation output value decreases despite government subsidization increases, innovation 
efficiency might still increase if there are greater decreases in other sources of input. As 
innovation efficiency takes into consideration all the sources of input, the relationship 
between a single source of input and innovation efficiency will reveal the true contribu-
tion of the single source.
This study attempts to answer the following questions. First, how does government sub-
sidization affect firms’ innovation efficiency? Second, what is the theoretical explanation 
underlying this effect? We first offer a brief literature review, followed by theory and 
hypothesis development. We report the empirical method and the results in the third 
section and provide discussion and conclusions in the final section.
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1. Literature review
The relationship between government subsidization and firms’ innovation output has 
been extensively studied but the results have been inconclusive. Some research has 
reported a positive relationship, meaning government subsidization improves firms’ 
innovation output. Lee (2011) found that government subsidization to firms’ R&D ac-
tivities, as a complement to firms’ own R&D investment, significantly improve firms’ 
innovation capability, particularly in firms that have a substantial room for upgrad-
ing their technological capabilities in high competitive industries. Kleer’s study (2010) 
found that government subsidization in terms of financial support lowers the costs and 
risks of firms’ investment in innovation, thereby attracting more investment in innova-
tion from other sources and eventually leading to more innovation output. In addition, 
Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) established empirically a positive relationship between gov-
ernment subsidization and firms’ innovation output, namely, that government subsidiza-
tion significantly raises the percentage of successful attainment of patent registration. 
Clausen (2009) categorized government subsidization as a form of research subsidiza-
tion and product development subsidization and found that while research subsidization 
has a positive impact on firms’ innovation output, product development subsidization 
reduces the firms’ input in innovation. Nonetheless, government subsidization comple-
ments rather than crowds out firms’ own investment in innovation. Based on the data 
from Chinese manufacturing firms, Wang (2011) found that there is a difference of 
output elasticity associated with government subsidization to R&D activities in different 
industries; government subsidization creates more innovative output in small-sized but 
highly promising high-tech enterprises. 
The second group of reports maintains that government subsidization does not enhance 
firms’ innovation output, and sometimes even constrains firms’ innovation activities, 
which eventually leads to a negative effect on innovation. Cannone and Ughetto (2014) 
found that the subsidized firms show an increase in indebtedness, while there is no 
evidence of any impact on firms’ profitability. Hu (2001) did not find a significant 
relationship between government subsidization and subsidized firms’ improvement in 
productivity in Chinese industries, while Gorg and Strobl (2007) found that govern-
ment subsidization increases the demand for resources used in R&D activities. With an 
inelastic supply of R&D-related materials in the short term, government subsidization 
will increase the costs of firms’ innovation activities, thereby creating a cancel-off effect 
on firms’ innovation. Feng et al. (2011) also found a negative though weak relationship 
between government subsidization and firms’ technological efficiency in medium-to-
large-sized industrial firms; in fact, government subsidization has significantly negative 
effect on the scale efficiency of innovation activities in those firms.
The above brief review shows that the effect of government subsidization on firm’s in-
novation output is mixed. This mixed result might be due to an incomplete examination 
of all the sources of input. There is surely a causal relationship between innovation input 
and output. As there are multiple sources of input (e.g., government subsidy, internal 
investment, private input from foreign or other organizations), examining the relation-
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ship between innovation output and a single source of input may lead to a distorted 
result. It is necessary to look into innovation efficiency, which takes into consideration 
both output and the total input, in order to correct the previous limited views that only 
look into the relationship between a single input and the absolute value of the output. 
2. Theory and hypothesis
To compete effectively in markets, organizations must find a balance between two types 
of innovation activities – exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation (March 
1991; Mueller et al. 2013). Exploratory innovation includes search, research, discovery, 
experimentation, and risk-taking (March 1991; McGrath 2001). It primarily involves 
challenging and departing from the existing knowledge and technologies. Exploitative 
innovation usually entails making improvements to existing knowledge, skills, and pro-
cesses (Levinthal, March 1993). It mainly involves development, refinement, increasing 
efficiency, and fine-tuning production (Levinthal, March 1993). 
The important differences between the two types of innovation lie in the levels of 
outcome uncertainty and the temporal distance between the locus of learning and the 
realization of returns (March 1991). Exploratory innovation is highly uncertain because 
it involves approaching territories of knowledge which are unknown and unpredictable; 
thus, the failure rate for exploratory innovation is much higher (Garcia et al. 2003). In 
contrast, the uncertainty level for exploitative innovation is much lower because the 
activities involve building on existing knowledge in order to improve some part or sec-
tions of a technology or product. Exploratory innovation targets long-term outcomes as 
research tasks are on a larger scale and progress slowly as exploratory innovation is “ex-
perimental” in manner and cannot rely completely on existing and familiar knowledge. 
Exploitative innovation, on the other hand, has a shorter and more specific schedule, 
and its outcomes are more predictable. Exploitative innovation aims at commercializ-
ing improved technology to meet the demands of existing markets (Benner, Tushman 
2003). As exploitative innovation improves existing knowledge, the knowledge base of 
the firm must be well-established. Some exploratory activities should have already been 
conducted in firms in order that exploitation can be done on the existing knowledge 
base. In firms’ research and development activities, research activities are exploratory 
while development are more exploitative (Garcia et al. 2003), thus, research activities 
need to be conducted before development activities can begin.
Exploratory innovation and exploitative innovation are not exclusive and are generally 
carried out simultaneously. As firms’ resources are limited, there is a balance in allo-
cating resources between the two types of innovation. Exploratory innovation is inher-
ently risky and involves a longer term investment but provides firms with a long-term 
competitive advantage; while exploitative innovation, though short-term oriented, cre-
ates cash-generating opportunities which not only stabilize the competitive position of 
firms in the current markets but also supports long-term exploratory innovation through 
such necessary resources as cash. Neither of the two types of innovation can afford to 
be ignored. However, when constrained by limited resources and the high expectation 
of the funding sources, firms are more likely to focus on exploitative innovation over 
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exploratory innovation as exploitative innovation is necessary for the short-term goal of 
survival. When they are endowed with slack resources and the sources of funding have 
soft but long-term expectations, firms will do more exploratory innovation in order to 
obtain long-term competitive sustainability (Garcia et al. 2003).
When allocating resources in the two types of innovation activities, the source of the 
resources can affect firms’ decision making. As the sources of funding impose different 
levels of pressure on firms, firms have different tactics for responding to those insti-
tutional pressures and expectations (Oliver 1991). Compared with internal funding or 
funding from banks, government subsidization to firms’ R&D activities places “soft 
budget constraints” and exerts relatively low pressure on firms (Buckley et al. 2007). 
Funds with tight budget constraints tend to induce firms to focus more on short-term 
returns, while funds with soft budget constraints allow firms to invest in riskier and 
longer-term oriented objectives. As a result, firms are more likely to use government 
subsidization in their exploratory innovation activities. 
The innovation efficiency perspective takes into consideration the cost and time invested 
in innovation projects (Wheelwright, Clark 1992). Innovation efficiency is improved 
when more innovation outputs are generated for the same costs and time or when the 
same outputs are generated with lower costs and less time. Innovation efficiency is thus 
the ratio of outputs over inputs. Previous literature has examined innovation inputs or 
outputs separately in order to measure the effects of technological innovation on firm 
performance with mixed results (Cruz-Cázaresa et al. 2011). Innovation is a complex 
process and thus should be evaluated as such (Tidd, Bessant 2009). Using efficiency to 
examine firms’ innovation performance captures innovation outcome better as efficiency 
avoids the skewed perspective created by considering inputs and outputs separately, 
a perspective that ignores the process of innovation (Cruz-Cázaresa et al. 2011). To 
some extent, innovation efficiency reveals firms’ management capability, namely, their 
attitude towards using available inputs in the process of maximizing outputs (Barney, 
Hesterly 2014).
Regarding how government subsidization leads to firms’ innovation efficiency, we pre-
dict that it is not the linear effect that previous studies have attempted to prove. As 
exploratory innovation requires a longer-term schedule and poses higher risk, and as 
government subsidization places relatively soft budget constraints, firms are more likely 
to use government subsidization (rather than internally raised funds or bank loans) for 
exploratory innovation activities. For Chinese firms, government subsidies encourage 
firms’ decisions to freeze their internal capital input in order to receive subsequent gov-
ernment subsidies, thereby creating a crowding-out effect (Xiao et al. 2013) and leading 
to a situation in which a firm’s total input in R&D activities might become lower after 
receiving a government subsidy.
When government subsidization occurs on a small scale and firms use these subsidies 
in their exploratory innovation activities, innovation outputs from exploratory inno-
vation activities may not be produced quickly because the new knowledge has to be 
created through exploration before exploitation can happen. It is impossible for com-
192
Q. Huang et al. Effect of government subsidization on Chinese industrial firms’ ...
mercialization based on new knowledge to occur while the new knowledge is still be-
ing created. Continuous inputs do not guarantee outputs from exploratory innovation 
activities. Though exploratory scientific research enhances understanding in a special 
knowledge domain, it may not have an immediate effect on new product output. Moreo-
ver, exploratory research is known to be risky and has a high failure rate particularly 
with insufficient and discontinuous funding. In this case, firms’ innovation efficiency 
may decline when the inputs are on a small scale. We argue that when firms only use 
government subsidization for exploratory innovation activities and the subsidization is 
in small scale, firms’ performance in terms of innovation efficiency declines. In contrast, 
when government subsidization comes in a large scale, sufficient enough to complete 
stages of exploratory innovation, firms will use the rest of the fund in combination with 
their internally raised funds for exploitative innovation, launching new products, thereby 
generating noticeable outputs. As a result, innovation efficiency starts to increase. Taken 
together, the above discussions lead to the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis: There is a U-shaped relationship between government subsidization and 
firms’ innovation efficiency such that firms’ innovation efficiency declines first and then 
increases with the increase of government subsidization.
3. Methodology
3.1. Models
The stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) model is used in the substantial literature of stud-
ies of production, cost, revenue, and profit, and was developed originally by Aigner 
et al. (1977). The stochastic frontier model is:
 ( ),y f x v u= α + − ,  (1)
where y is the observed outcome (goal attainment); α is the to-be-estimated coeffi-
cient; ( ) 0  ,  i if x xα = α + α∑ is the function of output from input x, which determines 
part of the frontier; v is the stochastic part; ( ) ,  f x α  + v is the optimal frontier goal; 
and u represents “inefficiency,” which is a positive, random variable, and a measure of 
percentage by which the particular observation fails to achieve the frontier, the ideal 
production rate.
A strictly orthodox interpretation embedded in a Cobb-Douglas production model will 
lead to the following model (Greene 2002):
 0ln lni iy x v u= α + α + −∑ ,  (2)
or
 ( ) ( ), expy f x v u= α − .  (3)
Specifically in this study, the form is:
 ( ) ( )( 1) , expi t it it ity f x v u+ = α − ,  (4)
where yi(t+1) is the innovation output, i is the province in which the firms in question 
are located; t + 1 refers to time (a year ahead of inputs), taking into consideration the 
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delayed effect of inputs on the output so that y is forwarded to the year of t + 1; xit is 
the input vector; vit – uit is the error; and v is the stochastic part and presents a symmet-
ric disturbance: 2 ~ 0, vv N  σ . u is independent from v and has a truncated distribution 
above zero: 2 ~ 0, uu N  σ  (Aigner et al. 1977).
When choosing a specific production model for our study, the translog model is more 
appropriate than the Cobb-Douglas model. The Cobb-Douglas production model as-
sumes that technologies are neutral and that the output elasticities of the input factors 
are constant, while the translog model is more relaxed regarding these assumptions 
(van Garderen et al. 2000). When using panel data, it is impossible to know beforehand 
whether the assumed conditions can be met. Therefore, the translog model is adopted 
here:




1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2i t it it it it it it it it
v u
u
Y K L K L K L v u+

= α + α + α + α + α + α × + −





where K refers to capital input, which includes capital input from all sources, and L 
refers to labor input. If λ is close to 0, then there is no inefficiency effect. 
One important extension of the SFA model is that production efficiency can be measured 
by the ratio between the total output Y and the optimal frontier (Aigner et al. 1977). As 
a result, the innovation efficiency in this study is measured by the ratio:
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where TE stands for technological efficiency, with a value between 0 and 1. In order to 
explain the factors affecting technological inefficiency, we adopt Battese and Coelli’s 
(1995) technological inefficiency function:
 
2
0 1 2 itit it it itu Gov Gov Z w= β + β + β + β + , (7)
in which Govit refers to government subsidization, Zit refers to the rest of the factors af-
fecting technological innovation efficiency, including infrastructure development level, 
labor quality, and market openness according to previous studies (Cooke et al. 1998; 
Crepon et al. 1998; Dahlander, Gann 2010); and wit is the random error. As u >= 0, the 
interpretation of the sign of these coefficients will reflect their effect on inefficiency. 
3.2. Data and variables
The panel data come from “Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology Activities of 
Industrial Enterprises” and “China Statistical Yearbook” published between 2006 and 
2013. We included 29 provinces without Tibet and Hainan because there are too many 
missing data from the two provinces. 
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Yi(t +1), Innovation Output is measured by the total sales of new products in i province 
in year t + 1, taking into consideration a delayed effect of the inputs on the output. 
Particularly, the new product sales of a certain year are adjusted by the industrial out-
of-factory price index of that year. 
Kit, Capital Input: Drawing on Costa et al. (1987), the capital input of R&D can be 
calculated by using a perpetual inventory method:
 ( ) ( 1)1it i t itK K I−= − α + ,  (8)
Kit refers to the capital input of i province in year t; and Ki(t – 1) is the capital input of i 
province in year t – 1. The capital input of a certain time is the depreciated stock of pre-
vious years’ input plus the current year’s intramural R&D expenditure, Iit, which should 
be adjusted based on the price index of that year. Lit, Labor input refers to the full-time 
equivalent of R&D personnel in i province in year t, a variable with a standardized value 
in the database. This variable is a quantified description of the total manpower and time 
consumption in innovation activities in organizations. Govit, Government subsidy is the 
main factor in this study. The operationalization of this variable is to use a ratio between 
the amount of capital subsidized by all levels of government and the amount of the total 
input in firms’ R&D expenses in province i in year t. Infrastructure Development is 
represented by a proxy index which uses the total service value of telecommunication 
divided by the GDP of that province (Wang et al. 2012). The service value of telecom-
munication is critical to innovation activities because innovation activities rely heavily 
on the exchange of information and personnel coordination. Labor Quality is measured 
by the number of currently registered students in the universities and colleges out of 
every 100,000 people in that province as the majority of the graduated students will 
work in the organizations of that province ( Zhu et al. 2012). Market Openness is related 
to the exchange of goods with international market and thus is measured by the ratio of 
the total value of the import and export and the GDP of that province.
3.3. Results
Table 1 presents the variable statistics. Table 2 reports the results of the Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis, corresponding to function (5), in which we have four models. In or-
der to see whether there are differences in terms of innovation efficiency among areas 
with different levels of economic development, we divide the 29 provinces into three 
areas – the East, the Middle, and the West areas. Model 1 reports the results of all the 
provinces; Model 2 reports those of the East area, Model 3 the Middle area, and Model 
4 the West area. As previously mentioned, if λ is close to 0, there is no inefficiency 
issue. In all four models, λ is greater than 0.5, which indicates that inefficiency exists. 
In the meantime, the p values in all the models are significant, which indicates that all 
the models fit well.
Table 3 presents the results of the innovation inefficiency models corresponding to 
function (7). In all four models, the coefficients of Government Subsidization (Gov) are 
positive and statistically significant, while the coefficients of Gov square are negative 
and statistically significant, which suggests an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
government subsidization and innovation inefficiency, or a U-shaped one between gov-
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ernment subsidization and innovation efficiency. Thus, our hypothesis is supported that 
the effect of government subsidization first reduces and then increases innovation ef-
ficiency (see Fig. 1). The effect of the Infrastructure Development level is only statisti-
cally significant in Model 4 (the West area). The negative sign of its coefficient indicates 
that it helps reduce inefficiency. We speculate that the Infrastructure Development level 
does not have a significant effect on the East and Middle areas because the infrastructure 
in the two areas has developed long before the West so that its marginal effect declines. 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Unit Mean Minimum Maximum Standard deviation
Y 10000 yuan 22949371.477 65755.443 132541398.834 23975958.817 
K 10000 yuan 3826908.901 22912.806 22347187.331 3759719.312 
L man-year 49638.300 529.000 346260.000 49396.400 
Gov % 0.102 0.022 0.926 0.110 
Infrastructure 
Development
% 0.076 0.016 0.119 0.019 
Labor Quality Person 2357.379 1043.000 6410.000 1022.767 
Market 
Openness
% 0.310 0.036 1.548 0.384 
Table 2. Results of the stochastic frontier analysis

































































Log-likelihood –121.319 –113.541 –130.632 –125.769
Notes: t-values are in parentheses. ***p-value ≤ 0.01, **p-value ≤ 0.05, *p-value ≤ 0.1.
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Market Openness helps reduce inefficiency because market openness motivates learn-
ing and induces firms to increase investment in innovation. However, Market Openness 
is marginally significant in the East area while very significant in the other two areas. 
The market opened much earlier in the East than the other regions so that may explain 
why the positive effect of market openness is less significant in the East area. Labor 
Quality is significant in all the three regions because it is the main factor contributing 
to innovation such that its effect is comparable in all areas.
Conclusions
Through testing the stochastic frontier to see firms’ innovation efficiency as a result of 
government subsidization, we found that there is a U-shaped relationship between the 
two; therefore, we make the following contributions. First, this finding resolves the is-
Fig. 1. U-shaped relationship between government subsidization and innovation efficiency
Table 3. Results of the innovation inefficiency models
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sue of inconclusiveness in the literature regarding the relationship between innovation 
output and government subsidization. When government subsidies are offered to firms 
on a small scale, firms’ innovation efficiency declines because firms use the subsidies in 
exploratory innovation projects which do not create immediate performance, as reflected 
in those findings of Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Lee (2011), Kleer (2010), etc.; 
whereas when government subsidies are provided on a large scale, firms’ innovation 
efficiency starts to increase as exploitative innovation benefits directly from exploratory 
innovation and generates new products, thereby increasing innovation performance, as 
shown in the findings of Cannone and Ughetto (2014), Feng et al. (2011), Gorg and 
Strobl (2007), etc. It is also confirmed by Janz et al. (2004) that German government 
focuses its subsidies on fewer but large companies in order to reach greater innovation 
output, a phenomenon supporting the U-shape relationship. Second, by categorizing 
innovation into exploratory and exploitative, we argue that the major differences be-
tween the two types of innovation lie in the degree of riskiness and the sustainability of 
competitiveness created from innovation. Consequentially, firms make their investment 
decisions for the two types of innovation based on the characteristics of the sources 
of funds. Government subsidies offer soft budget constraints and impose less pressure 
on firms, such that firms are more likely use the subsidies in exploratory innovation 
activities. Although there is an extensive literature on how institutions influence firms’ 
decisions regarding innovations, we add to the literature a new finding that government 
subsidization encourages more exploratory innovation in firms. Third, methodologically, 
we use SFA to solve the conundrum of how government subsidization affects firms’ 
innovation output and argue that using firms’ innovation efficiency is a better way to 
measuring firm performance, which departs from the previous method of measuring 
separately inputs and outputs of innovation activities. 
We address some implications for policy making. As the relationship between govern-
ment subsidization and firms’ innovation efficiency is a U-shaped one, we hope to 
reduce the effect on the downward slope and enlarge the effect on the upward curve. 
In order to avoid the downward slope, it is optimal to skip the “small scale” threshold 
of government subsidies. A good solution is for governments to increase subsidies to 
a larger scale. Yet as government subsidization is a budgeted resource and cannot be 
enlarged arbitrarily, it is practical to concentrate subsidies on a selected smaller number 
of firms each year so that those firms can receive enough funding to pass the “small 
scale” threshold. The disadvantage of this approach is that other firms that also need 
government subsidies may have to wait longer for their turn. As shown in our data 
analysis, infrastructure development, market openness, and labor quality are positive 
factors in their effects on innovation efficiency, particularly for the west area of China 
where innovation efficiency is relatively low. If infrastructure development and labor 
quality need a longer term to change, market openness can be changed by providing 
incentives through favorable policies such as tax returns with a particularly large weight 
emphasizing the west area. In order for the west area to catch up with the middle and 
east areas in innovation efficiency, a policy that can attract high quality human resources 
to the west area should also be implemented.
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Our research has some limitations, some of which can serve as directions for future 
research. First, our study is based on data collected from published sources at an aggre-
gate provincial level rather than at a firm level, such that we do not have information on 
individual firms, which are the focal centers of efficiency studies. Future research should 
collect firm level data so that more robust results can be revealed. Second, we argue 
that exploratory innovation is riskier than exploitative innovation, and that firms would 
use funds with soft-budget constraints on riskier research projects. This is still a hy-
pothesis, though it is logical. Future research can empirically test this hypothesis using 
firm level survey data. Finally, innovation efficiency is measured by the ratio of output 
and input. As output refers to the sale of new products, it mainly reflects the output of 
exploitative innovation. Exploratory innovation output should include new theories and 
new laws, which are difficult to quantify. The challenge for future research is to find a 
better measure that can reflect exploratory innovation output so that stochastic frontier 
analysis can be more accurate in testing the special area of innovation. 
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